








Is  there  common ground  in  intergovernmental  fiscal  relations? This question  is 
tackled  by  examining  the  ongoing  federal‐provincial  debate  about  the  most 
appropriate way to allocate resources among governments and the related issue 
of vertical and horizontal  fiscal  imbalance.  It  turns out  that  the provinces have 
found common ground with respect to vertical  imbalance and the need to limit 







Fiscal  issues  are  much  of  the  stuff  of  Canadian  intergovernmental  relations.  In  a  workshop 
dedicated to exploring the scope for a renewed partnership between Quebec and the West,  it 
was therefore essential to consider the fiscal dimensions to that question. This article does just 
that.  It  examines  whether  and  under  what  conditions  the  Government  of  Quebec  and  the 
governments  of  the  four  western  provinces  might  be  able  to  find  common  ground  in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. This question is tackled principally by examining the ongoing 






is  the  case where  all  provinces  successfully  came  together  to  demand more money  from  the 
federal  government.  A  second  deals  with  situations  where  provinces  were  able  to  unite  in 
demanding  limits  on  the  use  of  the  federal  spending  power.  Section  III  provides  examples  of 
                                                             













Questions  of  revenue  allocation  among  governments  are  conventionally  understood  to  have 
both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The horizontal dimension is discussed first.  






reducing these  imbalances.   The  legislative details of  the program are  included  in  the Federal‐
Provincial  Fiscal  Arrangements  Act.  They  authorize  the  federal  government  to  make  cash 
transfers to provinces with below average fiscal capacity to help Ottawa meet its constitutional 
obligation  of  ensuring  that  all  provinces  “have  sufficient  revenues  to  provide  reasonably 
comparable  levels  of  services  at  reasonably  comparable  levels  of  taxation  rates”  (Constitution 
Act,  1982, Section 36.2). Differences  in  fiscal  need  (that  is,  disparities  in  the  cost of providing 
reasonably comparable services) are ignored in the program and the 2006 report of the federal 
Expert  Panel  on  Equalization  and  Territorial  Formula  Financing  recommended  that  these 
differences  should  remain  outside  the  program.  The  panel  adduced  several  reasons  for  its 
conclusion including: complexity in measuring differences in need,  intrusiveness into provincial 
jurisdiction,  and  the  absence  of  evidence  that  introducing  need would  affect  allocations  in  a 
material way (Expert Panel, 86‐88). The federal government has accepted this view. In essence, 




the  2006  report  of  the  federal  Expert  Panel  linked  to  its  “basic  commitment  to  fairness  and 
equity”  (Expert Panel, 18). The Council of  the Federation’s Advisory Panel on Fiscal  Imbalance 
similarly  wrote,  “Canada’s  Equalization  program  reflects  the  Canadian  values  of  sharing  and 
mutual support” (Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, 77). 
Although the  idea of equalization has enjoyed widespread support,  the formula for translating 
that  support  into  a  politically  viable  legislative  scheme  has  nonetheless  been  subject  to 
continuous debate. To accommodate and facilitate that debate, the 1957 federal legislation that 
created the Equalization Program also provided that the program would be reviewed every five 
years.  The  result  has  been  an  ongoing  dialogue  among  federal  and  provincial  governments 
regarding  the  legislative  details  of  Equalization.  And  since  these  details  determine  which 





been  contested  with  federal  and  provincial  ministers  and  officials  arguing  for  and  against 
alternative  ways  of  measuring  fiscal  capacity  and  the  fiscal  standard  to  which  less  affluent 
provinces  should  be  raised  (to  the  level  of  the  province  with  the  highest  capacity,  to  a  10‐
province average, to an average that excludes the hydrocarbon capacity of Alberta and so forth). 
In  such  debates,  individual  provinces  typically  and  understandably  have  taken  positions  that 
reflect their economic and financial  interests as well as historical and political claims (Advisory 
Panel  on  Fiscal  Imbalance,  32).  Sometimes  groups  of  provinces  share  a  common  view,  for 
example, when Equalization‐receiving provinces urge Ottawa to adjust program parameters in a 
way that will  increase  the total amount of money  in  the program and non‐recipient provinces 
take  the opposite position.  From a  federal Department of  Finance viewpoint,  these  issues are 
also  of  importance  if  only  because  they  determine  the  quantum  of  money  to  be  spent  on 
Equalization.  In  any  case,  over  the  years  federal  and  provincial  officials  have  debated myriad 
technical issues that have served as stalking horses for the amount and allocation of large sums 
of money.  
The concept of vertical fiscal  imbalance is  less widely accepted.   Yet  it has  long been “normal” 
for provinces to spend more money than they have raised through their own tax efforts and to 
press the federal government to transfer cash to them to make up the difference (Ruggeri, 83‐
126).  A  crucial  part  of  the  1867  constitutional  settlement  was  the  Government  of  Canada’s 
commitment  under  section  118  of  the  original  Constitution  to  pay  grants  and  subsidies  to 
provincial  governments  (Canada,  Constitution  Act,  1867).  Following  protracted  negotiations 
between the provinces and the Dominion government, the Constitution was amended in 1907 
to increase these amounts (Canada, Constitution Act, 1907). During the Second World War, the 
provinces  agreed  to  “rent”  the  revenues  from  three  of  their  principal  tax  bases,  including 




that  extended  the  tax  rental  agreements on  an  asymmetric  basis  until  the 1960s,  after which 
they  gradually  morphed  into  the  asymmetric  federal‐provincial  tax  collection  agreements  we 
have  today.  These  contemporary  agreements  effectively  allow  provinces  to  levy  their  own 
income  taxes  at  whatever  rates  they  see  fit  with  the  federal  government  collecting  those 
revenues on behalf of provinces  subject  to  certain  conditions. Not all provincial  governments, 
however, participate. Quebec collects  its own personal and corporate  income tax. Alberta and 








Since  the  mid‐1990s,  provincial  governments  have  referred  to  these  shortfalls  as  a  “vertical 
fiscal  imbalance” (hereafter VFI). What provinces meant by this term was something along the 
following  lines.  The  federal  government  was  raising more money  than  it  needed  for  its  own 
programs  resulting  in Ottawa  running  large budgetary  surpluses.  At  the  same  time provinces, 






stronger  spending pressures  than  the  federal government mainly because of  the  rapid  rate of 
growth  in  health  care  expenditure  and  health  was  a  priority  for  the  public.  These  factors 
together  constituted  an  imbalance  and  the way  to  correct  it  was  for  Ottawa  to  turn  over  its 
excess  federal  revenues  to  the  provinces  either  in  the  form  of  cash  or  tax  room  (Annual 
Premiers’ Conference, 2000, Noël, 2005). 
But during the Chrétien and Martin governments, Ottawa consistently argued that the concept 
of  VFI  was  meaningless,  pointing  out  that  provinces  have  constitutional  access  to  all  major 
revenue sources. Provinces therefore were free to deal with their deficits by either raising taxes 
or cutting expenditures (Dion, 153‐174). It made no sense to acknowledge the idea of a VFI. 





transfer  their excess  revenue to provinces. This happens  in all  federations  (Watts, 51‐55). This 
normal excess  is what  is often  referred  to as  a  vertical  fiscal gap  (Boadway, 51‐82).  Thus,  the 
presence  of  federal  budgetary  surpluses  and  provincial  budgetary  deficits  before 
intergovernmental  transfers  does  not  necessarily  imply  “imbalance.”  But  when  the  provinces 
are  still  very  short of  required  finances after  receiving  these normal  federal  transfers  and  the 
federal government  is enjoying  large surpluses and using these surpluses  through  its spending 








of  fiscal  imbalance  without  defining  what  they  meant  by  such  an  imbalance.  Subsequently 
Minister  of  Finance  Flaherty  asserted:  “Budget  2007  restores  fiscal  balance  with  provinces, 
territories  and  municipalities  by  providing  long‐term,  equitable and  predictable funding  for 
shared priorities.”   Whether  the provinces  accept  his  declaration  that  fiscal  balance has  been 
restored  remains  to  be  seen. What  is  certain,  however,  is  that  he  did  not  rest  his  case  on  a 
technical definition of fiscal balance. He simply stated: 
There’s been a lot of talk about fiscal balance, Mr. Speaker. But what is it really about? It’s about 
better  roads  and  renewed  public  transit.  Better  health  care.  Better‐equipped  universities. 
Cleaner  oceans,  rivers,  lakes  and  air.  Training,  to  help  Canadians  get  the  skills  they  need.  It’s 
about  building  a  better  future  for  our  country.  And  that  means  getting  adequate  funding  to 
provincial and territorial governments. We get that. The provinces get that. Canadians get that. 
Almost  everybody  gets  it.  So  we’re  taking  action.  Through  this  budget,  we  are  delivering  an 






In other words, Flaherty declared “enough  is enough”  in much  the same way provinces might 
say “enough can never be enough.” 
With  these  elusive  ideas  and  definitions  of  horizontal  and  vertical  fiscal  imbalance  as 
background,  we  move  next  to  consider  the  areas  of  fiscal  federalism  where  there  has  been 
interprovincial  collaboration  in  recent  years  and  subsequently  areas  where  conflict  has  been 
prominent.   
 Interprovincial Collaboration 
Following the 1995  federal budget,  the  fiscal position of  the Government of Canada  improved 
rapidly.  In part  this was because  the  federal government had cut spending dramatically  in  the 
1995 budget. But more  important was a buoyant economy that helped to generate very  large 
increases  in  federal  revenues while  the  rate of  interest on public debt was  falling. By 1997‐98 
Ottawa was running budgetary surpluses and debt had begun falling.    
A  big  part  of  the  federal  expenditure  reductions  were  the  transfer  cuts  associated  with  the 
introduction  of  the  Canada  Health  and  Social  Transfer  (CHST)  announced  in  the  1995  federal 
budget. The provinces objected, making the point that Ottawa was slashing cash transfers to the 
provinces proportionately more  than  it was cutting  its own programs. Provinces  then began a 
campaign  to  persuade  the  federal  government  to  restore  their  transfers  to  pre‐CHST  levels. 
Initially, they argued their position in terms of VFI but this abstract concept apparently had little 
traction  with  the  public.  When,  however,  the  provinces  began  to  translate  their  political 
argument  into  claims  that  the  federal  government  was  shortchanging  them  on  health  care 
funding  (Ottawa  had  once  paid  50  percent  of  their  health  costs  but  had  allowed  its  share  to 
dwindle  to 11 percent)  the political dynamics began  to  change  (Annual Premiers’ Conference, 
2003;  Provincial  and  Territorial  Ministers  of  Health,  2000:  29).  In  2002  provincial  premiers 
created  what  they  euphemistically  called  the  Premiers’  Council  on  Health  Awareness  as  the 
vehicle  for  continuing  to  wage  a  coordinated  public  relations  campaign  that  pitted  them 
collectively  against  Ottawa  (Provincial‐Territorial  Premiers’  Meeting,  2002).  What  is  relevant 
here  is  that  all  provinces  including  Quebec  and  the  western  provinces  were  shoulder‐to‐
shoulder on this issue. This was not surprising since all provinces stood to gain financially if the 
campaign was successful. The provincial pressures on the federal government led to an increase 
in  the CHST  in  the 1999  federal budget,  specifically  intended  for health care, and  the  federal‐
provincial‐territorial  (FPT)  health  accords  of  2000,  2003,  and  2004  (Canada,  Department  of 
Finance,  September  25,  2007).  The  cumulative  result was  that  the  federal  government’s  cash 
share  of  provincial  health  care  costs  rose  to  around  22‐23  percent  by  the mid‐2000s.  (If  the 
value  of  the  tax  points  that  the  federal  government  transferred  to  the  provinces  in  1977  is 
included in the calculation, the federal share was around 35 percent.)  
By  the  early  2000s,  the  provinces’  objective  case  for  a  large  VFI  began  to  weaken.  This  was 
mainly because the federal government had de facto acknowledged the justice of the provincial 
case.  It  had  increased  transfer payments  to  them and had also begun new direct  transfers  to 
provincial  clients.  Initially,  the most  significant  of  these  developments  was  the  2000  federal‐
provincial‐territorial  (FPT)  First  Ministers’  Communiqués  on  Health  and  on  Early  Childhood 
Development  in which  the Government of Canada undertook  to  increase  its  cash  transfers  to 






ml). The  federal government had also reached an  important understanding with  the provinces 
and  territories  on  a  National  Child  Benefit  program  and  Labour  Market  Development 
agreements had been negotiated. These arrangements either directly or indirectly took further 
pressure  off  of  provincial  spending.  New  federal  government  spending  commitments  for 
postsecondary  education  may  have  irritated  provinces  because  they  were  bypassed  (for 
example,  the  Canada  Foundation  for  Innovation  and  the  Canada  Millennium  Scholarship 
Program)  but  to  varying  degrees  this  federal  spending  also  indirectly  helped  the  provincial 
financial  position.  In  short,  the  provincial  case  for  VFI weakened  because  the  provinces were 
succeeding in making their case. To be sure, the provincial authorities did not stop arguing that 
they were being ill treated. And with Canada’s health care system still the number one priority 
of  the  public,  the  2003  and  then  the  2004  FPT  health  accords  included  further  large  federal 





Transfer  (CHT)  for  a  period  of  10  years  to  provide  predictability  of  federal  funding  to  the 
provinces and territories (PTs). 
After the 2004 FPT health accord, the provinces began to focus on alleged shortfalls in the other 
large  vertical  transfer,  the  Canada  Social  Transfer  (CST),  which  is  the  federal  government’s 
transfer to the provinces for social programs and postsecondary education. To varying degrees 
provinces  also  supported  municipal  appeals  to  Ottawa  for  more  money  for  cities  and  other 
communities,  including  for  infrastructure.  These  pressures  delivered  some  results  when  the 
federal  government  committed  additional  sums  for  early  learning  and  child  care  and 
subsequently announced the introduction of a CST escalator of three percent annually to come 
into effect 2009‐10. The federal government also agreed to provide a share of  the  federal gas 
tax revenues  for  infrastructure projects at  the community  level and created a  fund to support 
public transit. 
By the mid‐2000s, however, the political steam had gone out of the claim of VFI because it had 




governments  can  unite  successfully  on  issues  of  fiscal  federalism  when  their  objective  is  to 
obtain more money from the federal authorities. This is not surprising. After all, this is a game in 
which all provincial treasuries are fiscal winners. 
Yet  it  is  also  worth  noting  that  in  the  case  of  the  four  western  provinces  and  Quebec,  this 
coming together required them to set aside issues that might have divided them. These included 
differences  in  economic  circumstances,  party  label  and  traditional  policy  stance  towards 
Ottawa’s  use  of  the  federal  spending  power.  The  differences  in  economic  circumstances  are 
reflected  in  the  fact  that  since  the  1990s  Alberta  has  not  been  recipient  of  Equalization 
payments,  Manitoba  and  Quebec  have  been  consistent  recipients,  and  British  Columbia  and 













provincial  jurisdiction,  Quebec  sometimes  opted  out  and  negotiated  for  full  financial 
compensation.  Quebec  officials  also  resisted  accepting  conditions  on  any  transfers  Quebec 
received.  In  the  case  of  Alberta,  its  policies  aimed  at  clarifying  roles  and  responsibilities  of 
federal  and  provincial  governments  were  in  effect  calls  for  Ottawa  to  make  less  use  of  the 
spending power and better respect provincial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the governments 
of  Saskatchewan and Manitoba often argued  for  a  strong  federal  government  that  could  lead 
the  federation  in  the creation of Canada‐wide programs and redistribute resources to the  less 
affluent provinces.  They were generally willing  to accept  federal  conditions more  readily  than 
either  Quebec  or  Alberta.  With  regard  to  British  Columbia,  its  stand  on  these  issues  was 
sometimes strongly supportive of  the  federal  spending power and at other  times  less  inviting. 
These provincial  differences might have affected  the  results of  the VFI debate because  it was 
being  played  out  through  a  negotiation  for  specific‐purpose  cash  transfers  that  entailed 
conditionality  or  the  appearance  of  conditionality.  This  incremental  conditionality  was 
particularly hard  for Quebec governments  to  accept  regardless of which political  party was  in 
power.  
The result was that in several of the federal‐provincial agreements noted above the Government 
of  Quebec  did  sign  on  but  only  after  negotiating  specific  clauses  or  side‐deals  perceived  to 
protect Quebec’s autonomy.  In other cases,  the Quebec authorities practiced what Alain Noël 
has called “federalism with a footnote” (Noël 2005).  It declined formally to accept some of the 
federal‐provincial agreements announcing  its position through  footnotes  to  the  first ministers’ 
news releases.   
A  striking  example  of  the  first  case  was  the  2004  FPT  health  accord.  Quebec  accepted  this 
document  but  only  after  Ottawa  agreed  and  other  provinces  accepted  that  this  federal‐
provincial  agreement  had  room  for  Asymmetrical  Federalism  that  Respects  Quebec’s 
Jurisdiction,  as  the  joint  federal‐Quebec  side‐deal  was  headed.  In  its  opening  paragraph,  this 
document  again  reflects  Quebec’s  determination  to  ensure  that  its  traditional  constitutional 
position is not undermined by a non‐constitutional arrangement. It states: 






























the  present  federal‐provincial‐territorial  document  because  sections  of  it  infringe  on  its 
constitutional  jurisdiction on  social matters. Québec  intends  to preserve  its  sole  responsibility 
for  developing,  planning,  managing  and  delivering  early  childhood  development  programs. 
Consequently, Québec  expects  to  receive  its  share  of  any  additional  federal  funding  for  early 
childhood development programs without new conditions (First Ministers’ Meeting. 2000a). 
The point of providing these detailed examples of Quebec’s strategy is that the governments of 
the  other  nine  provinces,  including  western  provinces,  understood  the  realities  of  Quebec 
politics  and  the  apparent  political  necessity  of  any  Quebec  government  to  be  seen  to  be 
protecting  its  historical  jurisdiction.  In  this  sense,  the other provinces demonstrated  flexibility 
and good will in their relations with Quebec.   
In short, in the post‐1995 history of fiscal federalism, the main area where the governments of 
the  western  provinces  and  Quebec,  indeed  all  provinces,  have  found  common  ground  is  in 
vertical fiscal relations. All provinces determined that it was in their interest to rectify what they 
saw as  the  injustice of Ottawa’s  cuts  in  cash  transfers associated with  the  introduction of  the 
CHST. Every dollar  the  federal  government gave up would be a gain  for  them collectively and 
that dollar would be  shared among provinces on an equal per  capita basis. This  is  the kind of 
condition – one where all provinces win – that makes partnership easy. Indeed, it turned out to 






The  above  discussion  of  interprovincial  accommodation  on  conditionality  provides  a  useful 
segue  into  a  second  and  related  example  of  interprovincial  cooperation,  namely,  the  federal 
spending power as a  separate  file  in  its own right  (and not as an  issue  linked  to specific  fiscal 
negotiations  as  above). Although provincial  positions have often differed on  the  legitimacy of 
the  spending  power,  twice  since  the  early  1990s  provincial  governments  have  signed  on  to 
consensus positions to limit its use. In one case Quebec was a part of the consensus and once it 
was  not.  The  first  time  was  with  the  signing  of  the  1992  Charlottetown  Accord,  which  the 
Government of Quebec endorsed. Section 25 of that agreement set out a framework that was to 
guide  the  use  of  the  federal  spending  power  in  all  areas  of  exclusive  provincial  jurisdiction. 
Picking up on wording very similar to the language of the Meech Lake Accord, that section also 
provided  “that  the  Government  of  Canada  must  provide  reasonable  compensation  to  the 
government  of  a  province  that  chooses  not  to  participate  in  a  new  Canada‐wide  shared‐cost 
program  that  is  established  by  the  federal  government  in  an  area  of  exclusive  provincial 






to.  When  the  Quebec  Liberals  were  subsequently  elected  to  office,  they  continued  to  stay 
outside the SUFA. Quebec chose not to sign in part because it interpreted the 1999 agreement 
as  weaker  in  its  opting  out  provisions  than  the  Meech  and  Charlottetown  Accords  (see,  for 
example, Special Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, 47‐50).  
The spending power case thus illustrates that Quebec and western provinces can find common 
ground on  the desirability of  limiting  the use of  the  federal  spending power.  It  also  illustrates 
that sustaining such consensus can be difficult.  
Interprovincial Conflict 
In  this  section we  consider  the  condition  that  is more  likely  to  provide  conflict  than  common 
ground among provinces, namely, the allocation of revenue among provinces.  
During  the  late 1990s  and  the early  2000s,  federal‐provincial  fiscal  negotiations were  focused 
mainly  on  VFI  and  the  related  health  care  issue.  But  even  then  the  issue  of  horizontal  fiscal 















political  pressure  from  the  wealthier  provinces,  Parliament  finally  enacted  legislation  that 
provided  equal  per  capita  cash  payments  to  all  provinces  for  the  CST  beginning  in  fiscal  year 
2007‐08. But moving to equal per capita cash for the CHT, which is more than double the size of 
the  CST,  was  deferred  until  2014‐15,  when  the  current  legislation  is  due  for  renewal.  The 
amount  of  the  health  cash  transfer  has  been  particularly  problematic  for  the  Government  of 
Ontario as its relative economic position within the federation has deteriorated in recent years. 
Indeed, Ontario has been waging an aggressive political  campaign on  this  issue with a  special 
web  site  devoted  to  this  and  related  concerns  (Ontario,  2008).    The  governments  of  the  four 
western  provinces  and  Quebec  have  generally  not  supported  Ontario’s  initiative,  however, 
although the reasons for their opposition in some cases and indifference in others have varied.  
It is the Equalization Program controversies, however, that are our main focus here. The Annual 
Premiers’ Conferences during  the  late 1990s gave  these matters  relatively  low priority. But by 
2000 the Annual Premiers’ Conference had become more forceful on the latter point stating: 
The Equalization Program  is  constitutionally mandated  to  address  the horizontal  imbalance  in 
Canada.  Premiers  called  on  the  federal  government  to  strengthen  its  commitment  to  the 
Equalization Program so that the Program meets its constitutionally mandated objectives. They 
noted that  the ceiling on payments  through the Equalization Program may be triggered by re‐
estimates  later  this  year.  Premiers  reiterated  that  the  federal  government  strengthen  the 
Equalization Program including the immediate removal of the ceiling on Equalization payments, 
in  concert with  the  restoration of  the CHST and adoption of an appropriate escalator  (Annual 
Premiers’ Conference, 2000).     
The  case  for  removing  the  ceiling  was  subsequently  presented  to  the  House  of  Commons 
Standing  Committee  on  Finance  by  the  chair  of  the  Provincial  and  Territorial  Ministers  of 
Finance (Manitoba, 2001).  
In  September  2003  provincial  and  territorial  finance  ministers  released  a  document  entitled 
Strengthening the Equalization Program. Among other things, it called for a change in the then 
5‐province  standard  against  which  the  fiscal  capacity  of  provinces  was  compared  to  a  10‐





was  a  huge  increase  in  the  horizontal  fiscal  imbalance  between  Alberta  and  other  provinces. 
However,  this  increased  imbalance  did  not  initially  influence  Equalization  entitlements  in  an 
equally  large way.  This was because Alberta was not part of  the 5‐province national  standard 
against  which  entitlements  were  to  be  measured  and,  of  course,  a  very  high  proportion  of 
Canada’s  oil  and  gas  reserves  are  in  that  province.  But  a  consensus  had  emerged  before  the 
2007 federal budget in favour of a return to a 10‐province standard, for reasons of fairness, and 







For  many  years  there  had  been  controversy  regarding  the  extent  to  which  natural  resource 
revenues  should  be  included  in  the  Equalization  formula  (Expert  Panel,  106).    Thus,  between 
1957 and 1982, the rate of  inclusion had at different times been 0, 33, 50, and 100 percent of 
natural  resource  revenues.  The  1982  Equalization  amendments  returned  the  program  to  100 
percent  inclusion  but  also  introduced  the  5‐province  standard  to  remove  Alberta  from  the 
measurement of fiscal capacity and thus prevent a large rise in Equalization payments. With the 
new  consensus  for  a  10‐province  standard  and  thus  potentially  for  Alberta’s  natural  resource 
revenues to be included,  large differences emerged among provinces concerning the extent to 
which  natural  revenues  should  in  fact  be  equalized.  This  issue  has  been  discussed  in  detail 
elsewhere  including  the  reports  of  both  the  federally  appointed  Expert  Panel  on  Equalization 
and  Territorial  Financing  (105‐114)  and  the  Advisory  Panel  on  Fiscal  Imbalance  appointed  by 
provincial  and  territorial  governments  (77‐90).  Suffice  it  here  to make  two  simple points.  The 
first is that decisions about the natural resource inclusion rate entail big money. Moving from a 
5‐province  standard with 100 percent  resource  inclusion  (which does not  include Alberta’s oil 
revenues because Alberta is not part of the 5‐province standard) to 10‐province standard with 







Equalization  pool  of  money  would  be  smaller,  its  entitlement  would  have  been  $950 million 
higher  in  that  year. British Columbia would have gained  roughly $450 million under  the  same 
circumstances.  For Manitoba,  the differential  impact was  a  little under $500 million but  in  its 
case  it  would  have  received  the  larger  amount  with  100  percent  inclusion,  the  opposite  of 
Saskatchewan  and  British  Columbia.  As  for  Quebec,  the  difference  was  $3  billion  with  100 
percent inclusion (Advisory Council 80‐84).  
In  the  event,  the  2007  federal  budget  adopted  the  Expert  Panel  report  recommendation  to 
include/exclude 50 percent of natural  resource  revenues  in determining each province’s  fiscal 
capacity and the standard.  
The main  point  here  is  that with  such  large  impacts  depending  on  the  choice  of  formula,  all 










Labrador  and  of  Nova  Scotia  against  their  offshore  hydrocarbon  revenues  in  special 





previous  time‐limited  revenue  sharing  arrangements  that  had  been  in  place  between  Canada 
and Nova Scotia since 1982 and between Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador since 1985. 
These earlier agreements had provided for these provinces to receive payments from Ottawa to 
partially  offset  any  reductions  in  Equalization  payments  due  to  increased  revenues  from  the 
offshore. But others considered that Ottawa’s 2004 deals with the two Atlantic provinces were 
more  far‐reaching  than  the  1980s  arrangements  and  ran  more  strongly  counter  to  the 
principles‐based  approach  to  the  Equalization  Program  than  had  been  in  force  for  almost  50 
years  (Expert  Panel  on  Equalization  and  Territorial  Financing,  21‐22).  Adding  insult  to  injury, 
although  Mr.  Harper  had  promised  repeatedly  during  the  2006  federal  general  election 
campaign  not  to  include  any  natural  resource  revenues  in  a  reformed  Equalization  Program, 
once  in  office  the  Conservative  government  retreated  from  this  undertaking  and  decided  to 
honour this much criticized offshore revenue legacy it had inherited from the Liberals. And it did 
so  without  affording  comparable  advantages  to  Saskatchewan  in  respect  of  its  onshore 
revenues.  Understandably,  therefore,  the  Government  of  Saskatchewan  saw  these  offshore 
arrangements  as  discriminatory.  And  while  the  New  Democratic  Party  was  in  power  it 
relentlessly pursued a policy of trying to secure a commitment from Ottawa that would afford it 
the same advantages as these two Atlantic provinces. The 50 percent inclusion rate compromise 
in  the  2007  federal  budget  did  not  do  much  to  assuage  it,  as  the  NDP  reckoned  the  new 
arrangements were hurting its finances to the tune of $800 million annually. The Government of 
Saskatchewan did not, however, secure support from other western provinces or from Quebec. 
One measure  of  Saskatchewan’s  frustration with  this  situation was  that  in  October  2007  the 








was  in office, Premier Klein was fuzzy  in his explanation of his position,  leaving the impression 
that  he  thought  the  Government  of  Alberta  was  funding  the  program  directly  (CTV,  2006). 
However, Alberta authorities may have also judged that if the cost of Equalization were to rise 
sharply,  this would necessitate either higher  taxes on  federal  taxpayers  in Alberta or  reduced 
federal  transfers  to  Alberta  from  the  CHT  and  CST.  Both  possibilities  would  be  inimical  to 
Alberta’s interests. 
The main point here  is  that natural  resources are distributed unequally across  the  federation. 
Accordingly, provincial treasuries are affected differentially depending on whether and to what 
extent  natural  resources  revenues  are  equalized  in  the  Equalization  Program  and  inevitably 
individual provincial governments press the federal government to shape the program in a way 
that reflects their fiscal self‐interest. The treatment of natural resources by Equalization is thus 
not  an  area of  common ground between Quebec  and  the West.  Indeed,  there  is  no  common 
ground among the western provinces on this issue. 
















where  these  five  provinces  share  common  fiscal  interests?  Or  are  the  big  issues  inherently 
divisive? 
It has already been seen that  in  the realm of  fiscal  federalism the easiest way to construct an 
alliance  among  provinces  is  to  focus  on  policy  positions  from which  they  all  stand  to  benefit 
financially.  This  kind  of  situation  arises  when  they  can  find  some  plausible  basis  for  taking  a 
collective  run  at  the  federal  treasury.  This  was  the  case  from  the  time  of  the  1995  federal 
budget until the 2007 budget. Following the 1995 budget, the provinces had a cogent case that 
the  federal  reductions  in  transfer payments  to them were unfair and putting their health care 
systems at risk. They fought this issue politically and gradually won the debate with the federal 
authorities  increasing transfer payments  in 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2004.  In particular, the 2004 
First Ministers’ Accord on Health Care provided a long‐term federal financial commitment to PTs 
for health care with a new CHT. The Conservative Party bought into the 2004 FPT health accord 
in  its  2006  election  platform  and  signed  on  to  it  after  it  formed  the  government  that  year 
(Conservative Party of Canada, 2006, 43).  These  federal  financial  undertakings  for health  care 







infrastructure  and  labour  market  training,  their  priorities  will  match  those  of  the  federal 
government’s  and  they will  succeed.  From an  overall  fiscal  viewpoint,  however,  these  sector‐
specific transfers are small potatoes compared to the $35 billion (in 2007‐08) in the two major 
cash transfers to provinces (CHT and CST).  Having long term plans for both the CHT and CST, the 




2007  budget,  the  federal  Conservatives  tried  to  accommodate  the  governments  of 








governments  of  the  two  Atlantic  provinces  cried  foul  arguing  that  they  should  be  entitled  to 
payments  based on  the  2007  rules without  any  impairment  to  their  special  arrangements  for 
offshore  revenues.  The  result  was  a  dispute  that  pitted  the  federal  government  against  the 
governments of these two provinces. In October 2007, it appeared that the federal government 
had found a compromise that was satisfactory to the Government of Nova Scotia but not to the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador.  (The  stakes were greater  for Newfoundland and 
Labrador.) In the meantime, the Government of Saskatchewan was nursing a grievance that set 




world price  for oil.  Should  it  remain high,  this would add  to  the adverse effects on  the  trade‐
sensitive sectors of the Ontario and Quebec economies that were experienced beginning initially 
in 2002 and then more strongly  in 2006, with continued negative consequences for their fiscal 
capacities.  Conversely, Alberta  and Newfoundland and  Labrador would benefit  from a  further 
rise  in  oil  prices,  probably  reviving  the  acrimonious  debate  about  the  treatment  of  natural 
resources in the Equalization Program. As in the last few years, this would be divisive among the 
five provinces that are our focus.  
A  second  and  related  issue  that  could  easily  move  to  the  top  of  the  agenda  is  the  energy‐
environment file.  It  is already clear,  for example, that hydrocarbon rich Alberta and to a much 
lesser  extent  Saskatchewan  have  a  different  set  of  interests  and  policy  preferences  than  do 




What  about  the  prospects  for  common  ground  among  provinces  on  the  issue  of  the  federal 
spending power? The October 2007 Speech from the Throne stated:   
Our  Government  believes  that  the  constitutional  jurisdiction  of  each  order  of  government 
should be  respected. To  this end, guided by our  federalism of openness, our Government will 
introduce  legislation  to place  formal  limits  on  the use of  the  federal  spending power  for new 
shared‐cost  programs  in  areas  of  exclusive  provincial  jurisdiction.  This  legislation  will  allow 
provinces  and  territories  to  opt  out  with  reasonable  compensation  if  they  offer  compatible 
programs. (Canada, Speech From Throne, 2007) 
If  the  federal  government  adheres  to  this  plan,  it  will  be  committing  to  positions  that  the 
provinces  collectively  endorsed  in  both  the  Meech  Lake  and  Charlottetown  Accords.  Such 
statutory  provisions  might  be  welcomed  by  the  Government  of  Quebec  both  for  their 
substantive  content  and  symbolism.  To  the  extent  that  the  governments  of  the  four western 
provinces  publicly  support  this  federal  legislation,  this  common  ground  could  well  improve 










prices  and pressures  for new  international  approaches  to  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  they  are 
more likely to strain relations among these provinces than to ameliorate them. 
Conclusion 
This  workshop  considered  a  variety  of  ways  and  mechanisms  through  which  the  western 
provinces  and  Quebec  might  be  able  to  find  common  ground  in  the  management  of  the 
federation.  This  article  has  probed  that  issue  through  the  lens  of  fiscal  federalism.  Its 









Parliament  to  enact  legislation  that  would  impose  limits  on  the  federal  spending  power  and 
create  a  statutory  right  for  provinces  to  opt  out  of  shared  cost  programs with  compensation 
under certain conditions, as was proposed in both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. 
This  spending  power  proposal  does  not  require  PT  approval  to  be  implemented  legally. 
Nonetheless,  to  the  extent  that  PTs  lend  political  support  to  this  initiative,  this  should  be 
positive  for  the  climate  surrounding  intergovernmental  relations. As with  the  issue of  vertical 












2  These  comments on  the position of  the Government of  Saskatchewan applied until  the defeat of  the 
NDP government by the Saskatchewan Party in November 2007. As this paper was finalized in early 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